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ARGUMENTS 
THE COURT'S JURISDICTION WAS INVOKED UPON 
THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW. 
The Department contends that Mr. Yardley failed to invoke the jurisdiction of this 
Court by failing to name the Career Service Review Board (CSRB) in his petition for 
judicial review and his subsequent brief. Mr. Yardley has previously argued in his 
response to the Department's motion for summary disposition that he properly named the 
agency in his petition for judicial review as required by Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act (UAPA). UAPA contains statutory definitions for the material terms that it uses. 
Pursuant to and consistent with those definitions, Mr. Yardley named the proper agency 
in his timely filed petition for judicial review. Seef Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-2 and 63-
46b-14. Furthermore, since Mr. Yardley's previous response, the Utah Supreme Court 
has directly addressed the issue raised by the Department and ruled in a manner that 
resolves the issue in favor of Mr. Yardley. 
In Harley Davidson v. Workforce Services, 116 P.3d 349 (Utah 2005), the 
Supreme Court, in a decision filed June 21,2005, addressed the issue of appellate court 
jurisdiction over administrative rulings. The Court's ruling was simple and clear: "[w]e 
hold that regardless of whether a party seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of an appellate 
court under rule 3 or rule 14, the only jurisdictional requirement is the timely filing of the 
pleading initiating appellate review." Id. at 352. (Emphasis added). In so ruling, the 
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Court rejected the respondent's arguments that a wrongly titled petition, a petition not 
filed with the required filing fee, not served on the opposing party and a petition that had 
the incorrect court designation were jurisdictional defects. 
In an effort to distinguish Harley Davidson from applying to this case, the 
Department contends that factual distinctions between this case and Harley Davidson 
make it inapplicable to this case. The Department, citing to paragraph 5 of the opinion, 
asserts that in Harley Davidson all the deficiencies in the petition were corrected well 
before the briefing stage, unlike the facts in the present case. Resp. Brf. at 14. There were 
a number of defects with the petition in Harley Davidson spanning from failing to pay the 
filing fee to failing to serve the opposing party. Id, Contrary to the Department's 
statement, paragraph 5 of the opinion reflects only that the filing fee was paid and the 
name of the pleading was corrected. Id. at 351. Moreover, the Court's ruling in Harley 
Davidson was not fact sensitive or narrowly tailored to the facts of the case. Indeed, the 
Court specifically stated that it declined to adopt a "narrow application" of the ruling. Id. 
at 352. Thus, the Department's efforts to persuade this Court that Harley Davidson does 
not apply to this case because of factual distinctions are without merit. 
Mr. Yardley timely filed his petition for review. In doing so, Mr. Yardley properly 
invoked the jurisdiction of this court pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 14 
and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. Harley Davidson v. Workforce Services, 116 P.3d 349 
(Utah 2005). The remaining arguments advanced by the Department regarding the need 
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to name the Career Service Review Board (CSRB) in the petition for this Court to 
exercise jurisdiction over the CSRB decision that is the subject of this appeal were 
explicitly and implicitly rejected by the Harley Davidson Court when they stated "we, like 
the court of appeal, can find no principled reason to treat agency petitions differently that 
other appeals/' Id. at 352. Thus, contrary to the Department's argument, there was no 
need to for the Court in Harley Davidson to discuss the differences between an agency 
appeal and an appeal from a lower court because the Court found no "principled reason" 
to do so. 
MR. YARDLEY'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS GO 
BEYOND RECEIVING NOTICE OF THE ALLEGATIONS 
AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD. 
The Department responds to Mr. Yardley's argument that he was denied due 
process when the Department failed to utilize committee reviews and conduct a 
meaningful investigation by contending that all that was required was notice of the 
allegations and an opportunity to be heard and that Mr. Yardley's argument creates an 
additional due process requirement not supported by authority. The Department's 
contention is in error. 
When a public employee has an expectation to continued employment, they enjoy a 
property right in that employment that cannot be adversely affected by the public 
employer without first affording the employee due process. Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. V. 
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985), Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep % 616 P.2d 598, 
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601 (Utah 1980), As previously described by the Utah Supreme Court, "[d]ue process is 
not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstance; 
it is flexible and requires such procedural protections as the particular situation demand." 
Worrallv. Ogden City Fire Dep't, 616P.2d598, 602 (Utah 1980). Ultimately, "[t]he 
purpose of due process is to prevent fundamental unfairness." Kent v. Department of 
Employment, 860 P.2d 984, 987, nt. 4 (Utah App. 1993)(Citing State v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 
1319,1325 (Utah App. 1991). Thus, contrary to the Department's implied contention, 
due process protections in the discipline or discharge of a public employee are not limited 
to notice of the allegations and opportunity to be heard. 
As Mr. Yardley recited in his opening brief, the Utah Supreme Court has 
specifically addressed the issues raised by Mr. Yardley regarding the Department's failure 
to use committee reviews and conduct an investigation. Adopting a holding from a 
Washington Supreme Court decision, the Court held that when a public employer 
announces a particular policy or practice, the employer must follow the particular policy 
or practice. Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165, 169 (Utah 1992). The Court's 
holding is nothing more than requiring the employer to act with fundamental fairness by 
following the policies and practices it announces to its employees consistent with due 
process principles. The essence of the ruling in Thurston is also grounded in statute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63~46b-16(4)(h)(iii) provides that upon judicial review of a final 
agency action following an adjudicative proceeding, the appellate court may only grant 
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relief where the party seeking review has been substantially prejudiced by an agency's 
failure to act consistent with a prior practice. Accordingly, authority exists specifically 
supporting Mr. Yardley's position that the Department is required to act consistent with 
prior practices utilized in the discharge of an employee. 
In Mr. Yardley's case, the evidence developed at the evidentiary hearing 
demonstrated without dispute that the Department had a practice of using committee 
reviews in the process of disciplining employees and that it failed to use committee 
reviews in discharging Mr. Yardley. Likewise, the evidence also demonstrated that the 
Department, as a matter of established policy and practice, conducts an investigation as 
part of their disciplinary process which also was not followed in Mr. Yardley's case. 
(Addendum A). By failing to follow its own policy and practices in discharging Mr. 
Yardley, the Department acted fundamentally unfair and thereby violated Mr. Yardley's 
due process rights. 
THE WARNING APPLIES TO MR. YARDLEY'S 
DISCHARGE BY ITS PLAIN TERMS AND CONSTRUCTION. 
The Department responds to Mr. Yardley's argument that his discharge was in 
violation of the warning it previously issued him by contending that the warning was not 
applicable to the discharge for two reasons. First, the conduct for which Mr. Yardley was 
discharged was not of the "type" for which he was previously disciplined. Secondly, the 
warning only applied to future misconduct. The Department's response is without merit. 
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The Department's argument that the warning's use of the word "type" limited its 
application to a degree that it did not apply to Mr. Yardley's discharge because the 
conduct for which he was discharged was more egregious than the conduct for which he 
was previously disciplined, is simply an effort to rewrite the warning after its already 
been given effect. Considering that the Department previously disciplined Mr. Yardley 
for sexual acts committed alone and with his wife recorded on video tape and then issued 
a warning that he would be terminated should he engage in that "type" of behavior in the 
future, the reasonable and plain interpretation of the warning would make it applicable to 
sexual conduct committed alone or with his wife. The fact that the masturbation may 
have been committed in a different manner does not change the "type" of the conduct. 
The application of the warning, however, is not without limitation. The application of the 
warning is limited to the type of conduct for which Mr. Yardley was disciplined. 
Certainly inappropriate acts unrelated to the conduct would not be covered just as other 
sexual acts unrelated to acts of masturbation would not be covered. To contend that the 
warning would amount to "carte blanche " as the Department argues is an unreasonable 
embellishment of the warning. 
Perhaps the best illustration of the weakness of the Department's argument is the 
answer to the following question: would the Department rely on the warning to justify 
Mr. Yardley's discharge if Mr. Yardley committed the acts for which he was discharged 
after warning? Absolutely. The similarity of the conduct, how it was recorded would all 
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support that Mr. Yardley was previously warned thereby meriting his discharge. If the 
Department is entitled to rely upon the warning certainly Mr. Yardley is equally entitled 
as a matter of fundamental fairness. The enforcement of the warning is not and should 
not be dependent upon the discretion and preference of the Department, but rather upon 
its own terms and pursuant to law. 
The Department's further contention that Mr. Yardley's argument is unreasonable 
because it fails to realize that the warning only applies to future conduct not only 
overlooks the overall construction and language of the warning, but ironically is an 
argument in support of Mr. Yardley's position. 
The warning is constructed with the following language: "should this type of 
misconduct reoccur in the future..." In using the word reoccur, the interpretation of the 
warning that is communicated is that the matter is now closed, but if the conduct should 
reoccur, termination would be likely. To contend that by its reference to future, the 
warning has no contemplation to conduct that has already occurred is contrary to the 
wording of the warning. 
The essence of the Department's argument is that because the conduct for which 
Mr. Yardley was discharged occurred before the warning and not after the warning, the 
warning does not apply. In short, if Mr. Yardley committed the conduct after the warning 
and not before, then the warning applies - and would serve as a basis to terminate. As a 
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matter of fundamental fairness, the opposite must also be true - if Mr. Yardley did not 
commit the conduct after the warning, then he should not have been terminated. 
Furthermore, the warning was in an administrative complaint that Mr. Yardley did 
not appeal thereby resulting in its inclusion into the final order by reference. As a final 
order, Mr. Yardley would reasonably believe the matter was closed with the only 
remaining concern that he take the warning seriously and not repeat the misconduct lest 
his employment would be terminated. That belief is also consistent with Mr. Yardley's 
required participation in the "performance plan" as a result of his prior discipline where 
the intent of the plan was to bring closure to the matter. (RT.302:34-35). 
CONCLUSION 
The issue as to whether Mr. Yardley properly invoked this Court's jurisdiction has 
been resolved. Mr. Yardley invoked this Court's jurisdiction when he timely filed his 
petition for judicial review. 
By failing to follow its practice and policy of utilizing committee reviews and 
conducting an investigation in Mr. Yardley's case, the Department violated his due 
process rights in their discharge of his employment. Furthermore, the Department's 
discharge of Mr. Yardley's employment violated the terms of the warning they previously 
issued him. Because the warning was an enforceable component of the Department's 
employment relationship with Mr. Yardley his discharge was improper. Accordingly, the 
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CSRB's decision upholding the Department's discharge of Mr. Yardley's employment 
was not rational nor reasonable. 
Because Mr. Yardley was improperly discharged, the decision of the CSRB 
upholding his discharge should be set aside and reversed and Mr. Yardley should be 
reinstated to his employment with the Department and awarded all appropriate back pay 
and other wages or compensation as provided by law from the dat/of his discharge. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 22 n ^^of /eptember io05. 
x&7\. iN^kamura / 
fhsel for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, REBECCA L. WHETZEL, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-
delivered _ J _ _ copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State 
Street, 5th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and 3i copies to the Utah Attorney 
General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 
140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this 26th day of September 2005. 
iCCA L. WHETZEL 
Delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's Office as 
set forth above, this°^-7 day of September 2005. 
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Addendum A 
imposition of discipline as other career service members. 
1. If a mediation or due process hearing is granted by the Department, 
there shall be no right of appeal beyond the Executive Director. 
2. The decision to grant a mediation or hearing to a probationary or 
exempt member lies within the discretion of the Executive Director/designee. 
C. Probationary or exempt status members may be terminated only with the 
prior approval of the Executive Director. 
D. The Executive Director/designee shall provide written notification to the 
employee specifying the reasons for the dismissal or demotion and the effective 
date. 
AE 03/02.08 Procedure: Supervisory and Administrative Staff 
A. Supervisory and administrative staff are held to higher standards than 
non-managerial members. 
B. Greater sanctions may be imposed on supervisory and administrative staff 
than on non-managerial members. 
AE 03/02,09 Procedure: Certified Peace Officers and Correctional Officers 
A. Certified officers hold a high level of public trust and shall be held to 
higher standards of conduct than civilian members. 
B. Greater sanctions may be imposed on certified officers. 
C. Conduct affecting officer certification shall be referred to POST. 
D. Decertification or suspension of any Peace Officer or Correctional 
Officer by POST may result in termination of the member's employment with the 
Department. 
AE 03/03.00 RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY IN MEMBER DISCIPLINE 
AE 03/03.01 Policy 
It is the policy of the Department that: 
A. each division shall perform the investigative functions in all suspected 
and/or reported infractions except: 
1. sexual harassment; 
2. discrimination; 
3. conduct in violation of federal or State law, or municipal 
ordinance, excluding minor traffic violations; 
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4. firearms violations; 
5. inappropriate use of alcohol and substance abuse; 
6. use of excessive force; or 
7. other violations which, on a case-by- case basis, the Deputy 
Director may assign to OPSE. 
B. in cases where one or more of the above is alleged, the division director^ 
shall promptly refer the matter to the Deputy Director or the Department ~/ 
Representative; y ^ 
C. in allegations of sexual harassment and discrimination, the Human 
Resource Director shall be promptly informed so that appropriate advice can be 
expediently provided in dealing with the situation pending the outcome of any 
investigation; 
D. failure to promptly report any of the above violations shall be grounds for 
disciplinary action; 
E. in cases that involve the Executive Director's office, the Deputy Director 
shall function as a division director; 
F. in cases where a certified officer's conduct appears to have violated the 
provisions detailed in Utah Administrative Code R728- 409-3, "Cause to Evaluate 
Certification for the Refusal, Suspension or Revocation of Peace Officer 
Certification or Authority" the case shall also be referred to POST; and 
G. the Executive Director/designee may place the member on leave in 
accordance with 67-19-18(4). 
AE 03/03.02 Rationale 
It is necessary for the Department to provide for those infractions which may be 
investigated by each division and those that must be reported to a Deputy Director 
of the Department for investigation. 
AE 03/03.03 Procedure: Letters of Warning and Reprimand 
A. Letters of Warning and Reprimand should be used by managers and 
supervisors to formally censure a member and shall specify the reasons for the 
discipline, previous oral warnings and/or discussions and an admonition that 
behavioral change by the member is necessary to avoid more serious disciplinary 
action in the future. The written warning and reprimand are the only forms of 
disciplinary actions that do not go through the Executive Director/designee. 
1. A written warning is a written formal communication from a 
member's supervisor to the member warning the member about a problem or 
violation. 
2. It is not grievable beyond Step 4. 
Revised 12/1/93 AA 01/01.00 
